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Graphical Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Highlights 
 
 We analyze the effects of financial regulations and reforms on the cost efficiency 
of banks of 10 CEE countries for the period 2004-2009. 
 Cost efficiency scores are estimated using SFA. 
 Panel regressions examine the impact of regulation on bank performance using 
the EBRD and the Fraser indicators. 
 We find that reforms on labor and business markets exert a positive impact on 
bank performance  
 We find the effect of credit regulation banking on efficiency is positive. 
 We find that better capitalized banks are more cost efficient. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of financial regulations and structural reforms on the cost 
efficiency of the banking industries of 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries for 
the period 2004 to 2009. Cost efficiency scores are estimated using stochastic frontier analysis, 
whilst panel regressions examine the impact of regulation and liberalisation on bank 
performance using the EBRD transitional reform indicator and the Fraser economic freedom 
index. By considering both indexes we are able to account for the effects of progress towards 
more sound banking practices as well as the impact of the credit market, labor market and 
business sector regulatory regimes on bank efficiency. Our empirical analysis shows that 
structural reforms on labor and business markets exert a positive impact on bank performance. 
In line with the public interest view, we find the effect of credit regulation banking on cost 
efficiency is positive. We also find that better capitalized banks are more cost efficient. 
 
Keywords: Regulation; EBRD transition indicators; Fraser economic freedom index; bank 
performance; Central and Eastern European countries.  
JEL Classification: G21, P34, P52 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades countries from Central and Eastern Europe experienced in their banking 
sectors dramatic changes including liberalization, consolidation and privatization coupled with 
a sharp increase of foreign bank participation in their economies (see EBRD Transition Report, 
2010; Gwartney et al. 2010, 2012). Such reforms by changing relative prices of both inputs and 
outputs can have an effect on allocative efficiencies, whereas foreign entry may add to technical 
efficiency via the introduction of better technologies or business practices (Lehner and 
Schnitzer, 2008), especially when economic reform has strengthened the quality of the host 
country's legal environment and institutions (Poghosyan and Poghosyan, 2010). But financial 
deregulation may also encourage excessive credit and debt exposures that are likely to exceed 
the capacity of bank risk management systems and supervisory institutions. Consequently, the 
growth model on which many of the CEE countries relied in the pre-2007 crisis period, based 
on cheap funds from abroad to support credit growth, was risky and unsustainable. Against the 
backdrop of continuing financial market turbulence, falling lending volume compounded by 
exposures to distressed sovereigns, banks have found it even more difficult to remain profitable 
which brings into the forefront the issue of efficiency.  
 
Our aim is to investigate the effects of regulatory reforms on CEE banks’ cost efficiency during 
the period 2004-2009. First, we use Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate cost 
efficiency relative to a single CEE wide cost frontier controlling for country specific 
characteristics. These efficiency measures are then employed in panel models to estimate the 
impact of regulation on bank specific cost efficiency. We use an assortment of information, 
such as the transition indicator of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the Fraser economic freedom index (Gwartney et al. 2008, 2010, 2012), to 
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investigate the impact on cost efficiency of regulations related to credit market, as well as 
restrictions on labor and business markets, while controlling for other bank-specific, country 
and institutional-specific characteristics.1 More precisely, we examine the effects of regulation 
on bank efficiency in terms of two competing hypotheses: the public interest view hypothesis 
and the private interest view hypothesis. Our results indicate that more liberal labor markets 
and business sectors seem to be associated with better bank efficiency. On the other hand we 
find that banking sector reforms have a negative effect on efficiency. However, our results 
show strong evidence that better capitalized banks are more cost efficient and this holds 
irrespective of whether we control for the effects of the overall regulatory environment. 
 
The recent crisis has exposed some major gaps in the growth model for emerging economies 
as well as gaps in their overall framework for bank supervision and regulation. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence on the experiences of CEE 
countries during the recent crisis paying particular attention to the effects of economy wide 
regulatory reforms for the banking industry. Such an assessment is of considerable interest for 
policy makers given the insolvencies of several major banks in Europe, and accompanied large 
withdrawal of funding from the CEE region by parent banks, thereby intensifying the 
contraction of credit and ensuing recessionary pressures in several CEE countries. Furthermore, 
an interesting question with important policy implications is to what extent economic and 
financial reforms are conducive to improving bank performance and therefore promoting 
financial stability which brings into the forefront the issue of cost efficiency not only from the 
point of view of bank's shareholders but from the point of view of the society. In other words 
is this process of “financialization” socially optimal? 2,3 What are the interactions between 
financialization and crises? An answer to the first question is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, we provide empirical evidence that sheds some light on the second question.  
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We follow the methodology of Mamatzakis et al. (2013) deriving cost efficiency scores for the 
same CEE countries albeit with some important differences. First, we use parametric (SFA) 
methods allowing for measurement error while controlling for firm-specific effects in 
constructing individual bank efficiency measures. This is in contrast to Mamatzakis et al. 
(2013) who use non-parametric methods such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) that are 
sensitive to outliers and data measurement errors. Second, Mamatzakis et al. (2013) consider a 
broad spectrum of the Fraser Index whereas we focus specifically on the subcomponents of the 
index that have the strongest influence on bank performance.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on bank 
efficiency and regulations. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 introduces the stochastic 
frontier model and presents the results of the fixed effects cost efficiency model. Section 5 
describes the dynamic panel model and estimation results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development  
 
According to Hughes and Mester (2015) two broad approaches are generally used in the 
literature to explain bank performance: structural and nonstructural. Nonstructural approaches 
choose different performance measures (e.g. ROE, ROA, net interest margins, Tobin’s q-ratio 
among others), and explain these measures by an assortment of bank specific or institutional 
factors. Structural approaches are based on theoretical models of banking behavior such as cost 
minimization or profit maximization. Structural approaches rely on estimating an “efficient 
frontier” using linear programming methods such as Data Envelopment Analysis or parametric 
methods such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Distribution Free Approach, and treating 
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deviations from such frontier as a measure of inefficiency. Cost efficiency refers to the 
minimum cost of producing a unit of output given input prices and deviations from minimum 
cost can be ‘technical’ arising from excessive input use to produce that output or ‘allocative’ 
arising from employing the wrong input mix given their prices. 
 
2.1 Credit market regulation and efficiency 
Empirical cross-country studies have analyzed the impact of regulations on bank performance 
considering different financial measures (Barth et al. 2004, 2008, Djalilov and Piesse 2016), 
bank ratings (Pasiouras et al. 2006, Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008), financial and non-financial 
factors (Pasiouras et al. 2009, Barth et al. 2013). The evidence is not always clear cut (Barth 
et al. 2013) and hence the relationship between regulation and bank performance 
remains an empirical question.4 Using a stochastic frontier approach, Fries and Taci (2005) 
examine the relative cost efficiency of banks in 15 Eastern European Countries and find that 
(p. 58) “progress in liberalising interest rates and credit allocation and in implementing a 
framework of prudential regulation and supervision, as measured by an index of the EBRD 
banking reform, has a non-linear association with cost efficiency.” Brissimis et al. (2008) find 
that both banking sector reform and competition have a positive effect on cost efficiency in 
CEE countries. Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009) report that non-banking reforms, as 
measured by the EBRD non-banking transition indicator, are associated with higher profit 
inefficiency whereas banking reforms are important for bank profitability. Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki et al. (2009b) report a positive relationship between profit efficiency and banking 
reform using the EBRD index. Similarly, Delis et al. (2011) find that the ERBD banking reform 
index has a positive effect on bank productivity in transition economies, whereas Fang et al. 
(2011) report that EBRD indicators of banking reforms, privatization and corporate governance 
have a positive impact on bank efficiency. Finally, in a recent study, Mamatzakis et al. (2013) 
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using the Fraser index in a sample of 10 CEE countries for the period 2000 to 2010 find that 
certain aspects of credit regulation such as foreign ownership and competition and private 
ownership are associated with improved bank efficiency. 
 
We summarize the contrasting effects of credit market regulation on bank efficiency in terms 
of two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, regulation enhances efficiency by encouraging 
competition and effective governance of financial institutions. Barth et al. (2006, 2013) qualify 
this view as the public interest view. This leads us to develop and test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Under the public interest view hypothesis we expect credit market regulation to be 
positively related to bank efficiency.  
Since higher levels of the credit regulation index are indicating less regulatory restrictions we 
will expect the index to be negatively related to cost efficiency under H1.  
 
In contrast, from the private interest view the imposition of regulation may increase the risk-
taking behavior of banks (e.g. Kim and Santomero 1988, Genotte and Pyle 1991, Van Hoose 
2007, among others) or limit the abilities of banks to exploit economies of scale or scope (Barth 
et al. 2013) which in turn can lead to a loss in efficiency. Hence according to the private interest 
view bank regulation is negatively related to bank efficiency which leads to develop and test 
the following hypothesis:  
H1a: Under the private interest view hypothesis we expect credit market regulation to be 
negatively related to bank efficiency (i.e. the credit regulation index to be positively associated 
with cost efficiency). 
 
2.2 Labor market and business regulations and efficiency 
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The institutional settings of the labor market and business sector along with the economy’s 
overall regulatory environment are likely to have an effect on bank efficiency and the stability 
of the banking system. Several studies (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers 2000, Besley and Burgess 
2004, Scarpetta and Tressel 2004) suggest that more stringent labor market regulations may 
induce efficiency and productivity loses for firms. The institutional environment in which 
banks operate is important. For instance, Barth et al. (2013) find that better institutional 
environments in terms of laws and regulations exert a positive and significant impact on bank 
operating efficiency. This leads us to formulate the following testable hypothesis:  
 
H2: Labor market rigidities are expected to be negatively related to cost efficiency.  
Since higher levels of the index of labor market reforms are indicating a higher level of 
economic freedom (less regulatory restrictions) we will expect the index to be positively related 
to cost efficiency.  
 
Business market regulation refers to regulations and barriers that prevent entry and reduce 
competition in the market and may affect bank efficiency through spillover effects. A favorable 
business environment, with protection of intellectual property, secure property rights, and low 
entry barriers would stimulate business activity and firm creation (Klapper et al. 2006) whereas 
weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits and consequently 
adversely affect firm’s investment decisions and financing (Johnson et al. 2002). According to 
Johnson et al. (2002: p.1354-1355), “insecure property rights mean firms have limited incentive 
to invest and therefore little demand for external finance”. This in turn has an adverse impact 
on credit market development and therefore on bank performance which lead us to formulate 
the following testable hypothesis:  
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H3: Lower regulatory restrictions in the business sector have a positive impact on bank 
efficiency. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper was extracted from the IBCA-Bankscope database for the period 
2004 to 2009. It comprises samples of 268 commercial banks, and after removing errors and 
inconsistencies, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 1,611 bank-year observations. Table 1 
summarizes our data showing similarities but also some notable differences across CEE 
countries. For example, banks tend to be much larger on average in the Czech Republic where 
also loan loss provisions as a share of total loans are much higher. Competitiveness in the sector 
(Hirschman-Herfindahl index) ranges from 52% in Latvia to 90% in Estonia. Not surprisingly, 
the more developed countries in terms of GDP per capita also have the highest level of financial 
development proxied by private sector credit. Most countries score highly in the overall index 
of credit regulations (CR). With respect to the components of the CR index a similar picture 
emerges.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 2 shows improvements in banking and economic reform over time. This is especially 
true for the CR-Own and the CR-Comp indices reflecting lower state ownership and increased 
presence of foreign banks as a result of the privatisation programmes and further reforms to 
prepare for EU accession. On the other hand, labor regulations (LR) have improved at a slower 
rate while business regulations (BR) remained roughly stable. There is a notable drop in some 
of these indices in 2009 reflecting the regulatory response to GFC. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
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4. Stochastic Frontier Analysis and the Determinants of Bank Efficiency 
We adopt a two stage estimation procedure. In Stage 1 we use stochastic frontier analysis 
methods to construct measures of bank cost efficiency. And in Stage 2 we analyze the 
determinants of cost efficiency employing panel models, both static fixed effects models and 
also dynamic panel models.5 The main advantage of measuring bank performance opting for 
stochastic frontier analysis is that it provides parametric estimates of efficiency at bank level 
that are subject to statistical hypothesis testing (see Pastor and Serrano, 2005, Meeusen and 
Van den Broeck, 1977). Setting the underlying framework of our methodology, every bank in 
our sample attempts to minimize costs so as to reach the optimum level of minimum cost. 
 
4.1.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency 
The following parametric translog specification of the cost function is chosen due to its 
flexibility:6 
lnCi = α0 + 
i
ii Pa ln + 
i
iYlni  + ½ 
i j
iij PjPa lnln +½ 
i j
jij i lnln   + 
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i j
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j
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2 t   
i i
ii YtPt lnln ii   +
i
iNt lni + ikD 
i
iZi   
+ ui + vi          (1) 
Where Ci denotes observed total cost for bank i, Pi is a vector of input prices, Yi is a vector of 
outputs, Ni is a vector of quasi-fixed inputs, Zi is a vector of control variables, and for simplicity 
we have dropped the time subscript. Total cost is the sum of overheads (personnel and 
administrative expenses), interest, fees and commission expenses. The two outputs are: loans 
(Y1) and other earning assets (Y2) which include government securities, bonds, equity 
investments, CDs. The vector Pi of input prices contains the price of labor measured as the 
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ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (P1) and the price of borrowed fund measured as 
total interest expenses over total deposits and short-term funding (P2). The special 
characteristic of equation (1) refers to the error term that consists of two parts, vit accounts 
essentially for the classical error term that follows a normal distribution whilst uit represents 
the (one-sided) inefficiency term as bank i could incur higher costs when benchmarked against 
its best performing peers in the sample. Given that inefficiency cannot take negative values this 
term follows the half-normal distribution. We also include two fixed inputs, namely physical 
capital (N1) and equity (N2). Equity inclusion is of some importance as it represents valuable 
funding and as such could impact upon cost structure (Berger and Mester, 1997). Moreover, 
exclusion of equity would result in biased estimations as banks with higher equity capital could 
display risk aversion in terms of behaviour compared to banks with lower level of equity.7 The 
control variables include GDP growth per capita (Z1) to capture cross-country heterogeneity 
in terms of the underlying macroeconomic framework and the inflation rate (Z2) as a general 
financial stability index.  
Lastly, we apply linear homogeneity and symmetry in quadratic terms in line with duality 
theory. Country and time effects are also captured.8 We opt for maximum likelihood estimation 
of the stochastic frontier model where the parameters of error variance are 
2
 =
2
u  +
2
v and γ =
2
u /
2
 . 
4.1.2 Cost Efficiency Estimates 
Table 3 reports cost efficiency estimates obtained from equation (1) for each country for the 
period 2004 to 2009. According to the SFA results average overall cost efficiency is 0.794 
indicating that the average CEE bank could reduce its costs by 20.6% to match the performance 
of its most efficient peers. Our results corroborate previous studies for transition economies 
(e.g. Kasman and Yildirim 2006, Yildirim and Philippatos 2007, Mamatzakis et al. 2008). 
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Table 3 also shows that average bank cost efficiency across the CEE region has increased from 
2004 (date in which most CEE countries joined the EU) to 2009. Hence the new member states 
appear to have made significant performance improvements in their banking systems after 
joining the EU, and this holds in spite of the adverse effects of the global financial crisis.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
4.2 Determinants of Cost Efficiency 
Next we employ cost efficiency scores, as derived from the sample of CEE countries that share 
a common frontier, to estimate the impact of the economic environment on bank performance, 
using as control variables bank specific characteristics and the structure of the national financial 
systems. Specifically, we adopt panel data methods to estimate a fixed effects model specified 
as: 
  it i i it i it i it it
i i i
Eff ZB X reg e             (2) 
Where Effit denotes bank cost efficiency, ZBit is a vector of bank specific characteristics, Xit 
accounts for the level of economic development and financial structure, whilst regit is a vector 
of regulation and reform indicators. Fixed effects ( i ) capture unobserved time-invariant bank 
specific heterogeneity which may be correlated with the regulation indexes or with observed 
bank specific variables. Time dummies and country dummies may also be introduced to capture 
structural changes or other time-varying unobserved effects which may be common across 
banks and account for differences across countries, respectively.9  
 
We control for bank characteristics using (log) total assets as a proxy for economies of scale, 
this can lead to either higher or lower costs for the bank (Fries and Taci, 2005); the ratio of 
loans to assets as a proxy for asset utilisation which is expected to have a positive effect on 
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cost efficiency; the ratio of equity over total assets as a proxy for capital adequacy, which is 
also expected to have a positive effect on efficiency as better capitalised banks have stronger 
incentives in improving their performance and minimising costs. We also include loan loss 
provisions, accounting for the quality of credit portfolio, as a determinant of cost efficiency. In 
empirical studies there is mixed evidence on the sign of loan loss provisions as their impact on 
bank performance in the short term may be different compared to the long term. To control for 
financial structure, we consider the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP 
(DCPS) capturing the level of development of the financial sector. We also employ the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) as a proxy for the level of market concentration as well as 
the interest rate spread (SPR) also a measure of market power. Finally, as a control for the 
general macroeconomic environment, we consider real GDP per capita in purchasing power 
parity (PPP) terms (Karas et al 2010, Kosac et al 2009 and Poghosyan and Poghosyan 2010). 
We also include inflation to capture financial stability from a macroeconomic perspective 
(Havrylchyk 2006, Bonin et al. 2005, and Yildirim and Philippatos 2007). 
 
The reform and regulation variables include the EBRD indicators representing the level of 
progress of transition in East Europe and elsewhere (see table A2 in Appendix for detailed 
descriptions); and in particular, the EBRD sub-components capturing competition policy 
(Compebrd), banking reform (Bankebrd), and securities market reform (Secebrd).10 We also 
consider the impact of credit (CR), labor (LR) and business regulations (BR) on bank efficiency 
using the regulation indexes provided by the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney et 
al. 2010).11 Again we pay particular attention to the sub-components of the credit regulation 
index; namely, bank ownership (CR-Own), foreign bank competition (CR-Comp), private 
sector credit (CR-Prs), and interest rate controls (CR-Nir) (see Table A1 in Appendix for more 
detailed description).12 Based on the private interest view and according to our H1a hypothesis 
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more stringent regulations relative to foreign competition (CR-Comp) and private sector credit 
(CR-Prs) as well as greater government ownership are expected to be associated with lower 
bank efficiency, whereas progress with banking reforms and interest rate liberalization 
(Bankebrd) and the lifting of interest rate controls (CR-Nir) are expected to be positively 
related to bank efficiency.  
 
4.3 Cost Efficiency: Fixed effects results 
 
Table 4 shows results from the baseline model that excludes regulation and reform variables. 
We find that better capitalised banks are more cost efficient. This result is in line with other 
studies that find a positive relationship between capital adequacy and efficiency (Berger and 
Mester 1997, Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007, Delis et al. 2011) and is also robust to controlling 
for country-specific factors (see column 2). However, the effect of size (log Assets) on cost 
efficiency is negative. A possible explanation for this finding may be due to the presence of 
large state banks in our sample that are highly inefficient (EBRD, 2010). This result is 
contradiction with Triki et al. (2017) who find a positive relationship between bank size and 
bank efficiency. The effect of asset utilisation (loans/assets) on cost efficiency is also negative 
albeit statistically insignificant when controlling for country-specific factors. The negative 
association between asset utilisation and cost efficiency may reflect greater pressure in 
containing costs of credit origination and monitoring for larger loan portfolios. We find that 
both measures of market power, SPR and HHI are associated with more cost efficient 
intermediation operations. The association of market concentration with lower costs suggests 
that “higher concentration reflects competitive selection and consolidation through survival of 
more efficient banks” Fries and Taci (2005). This finding is also in line with other studies that 
find a positive relationship between cost efficiency and concentration (e.g. Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2007) but in contradiction with Delis et al. (2011) who report a negative 
relationship. The effect of GDP per capita is negative indicating the level economic 
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development is not necessarily an indicator of bank cost efficiency at least in the CEE region. 
This finding is in line with evidence reported by Mamatzakis et al. (2013). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
4.3.1 The Impact of Fraser Index and EBRD Regulations on Cost Efficiency 
We consider first the impact of credit regulation (CR), labor market regulation (LR) and 
business regulation (BR) components of the Fraser index on cost efficiency. Table 5 shows that 
the three regulation variables are significant at the 1% level. Credit regulation is negatively 
associated with cost efficiency rendering support to the public interest view hypothesis (H1). 
We also find support for the H2 and H3 hypotheses, that less stringent labor market regulation 
and business sector regulation, respectively, have a positive impact on cost efficiency. 
Mamatzakis et al. (2013) find that credit regulation and business regulation are not statistically 
significant while labour market regulation has a positive effect on efficiency. Table 5 also 
shows that the effects of capitalisation and size reported in Table 4 are robust to the inclusion 
of regulation variables. We find that financial deepening (DCPS) has a negative effect on cost 
efficiency. This finding may reflect the risks associated with excessive credit growth observed 
in several CEE banking systems in the lead up to the global financial crisis. Finally, inflation 
is significant at the 1% and positively related to cost efficiency. High inflation affects bank 
behaviour and induces banks to compete through excessive branch networks (Kasman and 
Yildirim, 2006).  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
We proceed next to examine the effect of credit regulation on cost efficiency in more detail by 
considering the main sub-components of the Fraser credit regulation index such as  CR-Comp, 
CR-Nir, and  CR-PrS .13 The results of table 6 show that only the CR-PrS variable is significant 
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on cost efficiency. The negative effect is in line with our previous findings (Table 5). A possible 
explanation of the negative relationship between the CR-Prs variable and cost efficiency is that 
lending to the private sector may entail costly monitoring and screening coupled with the risks 
of excessive credit growth on financial stability. Most of the control variables remain consistent 
with the results from the earlier models.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
We turn next to examine the effect of EBRD financial regulation indexes on cost efficiency. 
These results are presented in Table 7. We find that banking reform (Bankebrd) has a negative 
and significant effect on cost efficiency in the last column that also considers the other two 
financial indicators. The effect of capitalization on cost efficiency remain robust throughout 
our analysis while for the first time we find loan loss provisions to have a significant and 
positive effect on cost efficiency. This result is in contradiction with other studies that find a 
negative relationship between credit risk and efficiency (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007, Delis 
et al. 2011) but in line with Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009a) and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, 
et al. (2009b).  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
5. Dynamic Panel Analysis  
One of the frequent criticisms of models such as equation (2) refers to the endogeneity of some 
of the right hand variables, in particular bank specific characteristics, especially in situations 
where unobserved heterogeneity may be changing over time. As a way of addressing this 
criticism and assess the robustness of our findings we proceed to estimate both a dynamic 
version of the fixed effects panel model and a panel vector autoregressive model. 
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5.1 Dynamic Fixed Effects Model 
A common criticism of the fixed effects panel model is the static nature of the underlying 
relationships among the variables, when one would expect that such types of relationships 
evolve over time. This is in addition to endogeneity issues that arise in this context. We employ 
the Arelano and Bover (1995) dynamic panel data model that uses an instrumental variables 
methodology based on the GMM estimator to resolve the issue of endogeneity in a dynamic 
context. The model takes the following general form: 
1it it it i it i it it
i i
Eff Eff Z REG e          (3) 
Where Effit denotes cost efficiency of bank i in year t, Zit accounts for bank or country specific 
control variables and REGit denotes various EBRD or Fraser reform indexes. 
Table 8 reports cost efficiency estimates of the dynamic panel model using as determinants 
Fraser reform (column 1) and EBRD reform indicators (column 2). Efficiency shows some 
persistence. The coefficient of lagged efficiency is positive and significant with a value well 
below unity, a finding consistent with Delis et al. (2011).14 As before, we find that better 
capitalized banks are more efficient while size retains a negative association with cost 
efficiency and the same applies for financial deepening. Similarly, less stringent labor and 
business regulations have a positive effect on efficiency providing further support for 
hypotheses H2 and H3. However, we find that credit regulation has no longer an effect on cost 
efficiency, suggesting that the forces that underpin the two competing hypotheses, H1 and H1a, 
may be offsetting each other. The EBRD index of market reform capturing competition policy 
(Compebrd) is significant at the 10% level whereas bank reforms (Bankebrd) and securities 
markets reforms (Secebrd) are not significant. 15 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
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5.2 Panel-VAR analysis 
We consider next a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model in which all variables are jointly 
determined. This is used to address endogeneity issues as well as model the dynamic and cross-
sectional interdependencies that may exist between our bank performance measure and the 
EBRD/Fraser indexes. This is a major advantage of PVAR over a univariate panel regression 
model specification. An added feature of the PVAR model is that it allows investigating 
through impulse response analysis the transmission of shocks, such as for example those during 
the GFC across banks in the CEE region. Similarly, impulse response analysis is useful from a 
policy perspective to investigate the response to reform/regulation changes on bank 
performance. The PVAR model is sufficiently flexible to pick up any structural breaks through 
the responses of variables to various shocks. The model can take the following general form: 
, 1 , 1it i i t i t itW W X e       ,  i =1,…, N, t=1,…, T.      (4) 
Where Wit is a stacked vector of variables comprising bank efficiency (Eff) and either the 
Fraser reform indexes covering credit regulation (CR), labor regulation (LR) and business 
regulation (BR); or alternatively, the three broad aspects of transition EBRD indexes 
comprising competition policy (Compebrd), financial institutions, banking reform and interest 
rate liberalization (Bankebrd), and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 
(Secebrd). Note that PVARs have the same structure as VAR models where all variables are 
assumed to be endogenous and interdependent, but add a cross sectional dimension to the 
specification of the model. This is important since the dynamic structure of (4) above implies 
that such specifications capture the dynamic interdependencies among the individual units (i). 
The coefficient matrix β in (4) has dimension 4x4 matrix, whilst αi captures fixed effects, X 
controls for other bank or country specific effects, and ei,t denote i.i.d. residuals (Love and 
Zicchino, 2006). As required we apply forward mean-differencing to our variables with the 
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Helmert procedure (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Lastly, Monte Carlo simulations provide the 
standard errors for the impulse response functions (IRFs thereafter).  
 
Prior to estimating the panel VAR it is crucial to select the lag order. Following Lutkepohl 
(2006) we employ the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator for different lags j=1, 2 and 3.16 Note 
that we opt for up to three lags so as to examine any underlying autocorrelation. We find that 
choosing one lag is sufficient for our purposes. We also test for normality with the Sahpiro-
Francia W-test without observing any violations.17 
 
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions (IRF). In Figure 1 the plot in the first row depicts 
the response of bank efficiency (EFF) to a shock in credit regulation (CR), labor market 
regulation (LR) and business regulation (BR), respectively, measured in standard deviations 
terms. It is clear from the first row that the response of bank efficiency to credit regulation is 
positive for the first six years, with a hike after one period, whereas it dies out thereafter. This 
is an interesting result as it highlights that credit regulation improves bank performance, a result 
that one would expect to hold in particular in periods of financial crisis as prudent regulation 
leads to a safe and sound financial system. Our result is line with other cross-country studies 
that find a positive relationship between tighter capital regulation and bank efficiency (e.g. 
Barth et al. 2004, Barth et al. 2013, Pasiouras et al. 2009 find that stricter capital requirements 
have a positive impact on cost efficiency).  
 
On the other hand, labor market regulation asserts a negative impact on bank efficiency. This 
result suggests that banks could improve their performance in a more liberal labor market 
environment. Lastly, the impact of business regulation is positive on bank efficiency but only 
in the very short run and convergences towards zero thereafter. Our results are in line with 
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Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) and Barth et al. (2006), Kondeas et al. (2008) who emphasizes 
the positive impact of bank specific reform efforts on bank efficiency. Moreover, in terms of 
magnitude, it appears that credit regulation have the dominant effect on efficiency.  
 
Our panel VAR analysis encompasses solving a complex identification problem. A 
standard approach (see Love and Zicchino, 2006; Arias and Escudero, 2007) is to order 
the variable in the VAR following some preferences of which variables might be more 
exogenous than others. In that case the ordering should be to rank first exogenous 
variables followed by more endogenous ones in a sequential order (see Love and 
Zicchino, 2006). This is the standard identification strategy implicit in the Choleski 
decomposition, which induces a recursive orthogonal structure on the structure of the 
shocks. To this end, as regulation is outside the control of the banks, we consider it as the 
most exogenous variable. Thus, performance measured by the efficiency that comes from 
cost minimization at bank level, is more endogenous than regulation. The reverse 
causation has been also tested, providing similar results.18 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In Table 9 (Panel A) we report the variance decomposition (VDC). The findings are consistent 
with our previous results from the impulse response functions providing additional evidence 
of the importance of the relationship between reforms and variation in bank efficiency. We find 
7.2% of the variation of cost efficiency is explained by labor market regulation, whilst only 
0.4% is explained by business regulation. Efficiency also explains part of forecast error 
variance of regulation, in particular credit regulation and business regulation. Furthermore, our 
results (Panel B) show that EBRD reforms play a role in the variance decomposition of bank 
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efficiency with 15% and 10% of bank efficiency explained by shocks in banking reform and 
competition reform, respectively. Thus, a feedback channel from bank performance to 
regulation, which is highly associated to the environment that banks operate, also exists. 
Overall, the VDC analysis confirms the importance of bank specific regulation to bank cost 
efficiency as credit regulation plays the dominant role, whilst evidence of reverse causation is 
also present. 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
Figure 2 presents the IRFs from the 4x4 panel VAR of cost efficiency and the three EBRD 
reform indexes. Interestingly, one standard deviation shocks in EBRD reform indexes assert a 
negative impact on bank efficiency. This result is in line with the EBRD (2010) report that 
reforms have a negative impact on performance in the short run, and it is only in the long run 
that the economy could reap the fruits of structural changes towards more competitive forms 
of markets.19 Note, however, that in terms of magnitude, the EBRD reform indexes do not have 
a strong negative impact on bank performance.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents new evidence on the importance of reforms and regulations for the banking 
industry using the EBRD transitional reform indicator and the Fraser economic freedom index. 
Favourable economic conditions in the labor and business sectors seem to improve cost 
efficiency while banking reform appears to have a negative effect. Our empirical analysis 
shows that reforms in the credit market such as those allowing greater presence of privately 
owned banks, foreign banks, and the removal of interest rate controls have no impact on bank 
efficiency while a higher share of private sector borrowing has a negative effect. One possible 
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explanation, as alluded in the Gwartney et al. (2012: p.8) report, is that these indicators may 
not be as effective in capturing constraints on economic freedom and consequently they may 
not fully reveal the true impact of economic freedom on bank performance. The effect of bank 
regulation on cost efficiency is positive providing support to the public interest view 
hypothesis.  
 
Dynamic panel analysis confirms the findings of our static fixed effects models. It shows that 
labor market reforms, less stringent business regulations and competition policy reforms have 
a positive effect on bank efficiency. We find that bank size has a negative effect on cost 
efficiency. More importantly, we find that better-capitalized banks are more efficient. The 
relationship between capital and bank performance is the subject of ongoing research, 
particularly so in recent years mainly as a result of new regulations (e.g. Basel III capital 
requirements) in response to the Global Financial Crisis. We provide new evidence which 
clearly demonstrates that better capitalized banks are more cost efficient. And this is true 
irrespective of the stringency or otherwise of the regulatory environment captured by the EBRD 
transitional reform indicators and Fraser economic freedom indexes used in our empirical 
analysis. Given the opposing views and theoretical predictions on this subject, this is an 
important finding for more informed policy decision making. It will be of interest in future 
research to test further the relationship between capital requirements relative to the Basle 
Accords and cost efficiency and more generally the question whether it is optimal for banks to 
hold equity well in excess of capital requirements. Also another interesting issue as suggested 
by Lagoarde-Segot (2015) is to examine the societal and economic implications of the ongoing 
technological and legal changes in the financial system for the CEE countries.  
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Function (IRF) for one lag of EFF, CR, LR and BR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: EFF: efficiency; CR: composite credit regulation index, LR: composite labour regulation index, BR: 
composite business regulations index.  
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Function (IRF) for one lag of EFF, Compebrd, Bankebrd, 
and Secebrd 
 
 
Note: EFF: efficiency, Compebrd: competition policy, Bankebrd: banking reform and interest rate liberalization, 
and Secebrd: securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, respectively.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (2004-2009) 
 
Country lnP1 lnP2 lnY1 lnY2 TA E/A 
LLP/
L L/A 
DCP
S SPR 
HH
I 
GDPcpp
p 
INF
L CR 
CROw
n 
CRCom
p 
CRPr
S 
CRni
r LR BR 
Bulgaria 
0.011
8 
0.037
5 
13.1744 11.9846 920.16 
0.1
6 
0.05 
0.5
2 
40.49 
16.5
8 
0.64 9.348 6.84 
0.8
9 
0.90 0.83 0.99 0.97 
0.6
5 
0.5
3 
Czech 
Rep. 
0.006
7 
0.081
5 
14.6693 14.2881 
6.056.9
1 
0.0
9 
0.13 
0.4
6 
51.28 4.7 0.7 19.275 2.20 
0.8
6 
0.85 0.78 0.87 1.00 
0.7
1 
0.5
6 
Estonia 
0.017
4 
0.067
2 
12.9661 11.2281 
2.243.1
0 
0.1
1 
0.02 
0.6
1 
58.38 4.42 0.9 13.603 5.93 
0.9
4 
0.98 0.81 1.00 0.98 
0.5
5 
0.7
0 
Hungary 
0.019
3 
0.052
9 
14.3909 12.6196 
4.634.1
7 
0.1
1 
0.02 
0.6
2 
48.03 2.94 0.71 15.720 4.87 
0.8
3 
0.91 0.75 0.66 0.99 
0.6
6 
0.6
3 
Latvia 
0.014
5 
0.025
7 
12.3786 12.2651 
1.057.6
8 
0.1
4 
0.04 
0.4
5 
55.69 6.09 0.52 11.716 10.15 
0.9
0 
1.00 0.72 0.94 0.95 
0.6
0 
0.6
0 
Lithuania 
0.012
6 
0.028
8 
13.6913 12.3523 
1.773.9
2 
0.1
1 
0.03 
0.5
8 
35.33 4.48 0.8 12.824 5.09 
0.8
8 
0.84 0.82 0.90 0.96 
0.5
2 
0.6
1 
Poland 
0.015
2 
0.038
0 
14.1266 13.8026 
4.645.6
5 
0.1
4 
0.01 
0.5
7 
34.67 4.93 0.64 13.805 2.65 
0.8
4 
0.78 0.87 0.78 1.00 
0.6
2 
0.5
0 
Romania 
0.023
6 
0.051
3 
13.3715 11.9916 
2.291.5
6 
0.1
5 
0.03 0.5 24.65 
11.8
3 
0.66 9.328 11.58 
0.7
5 
0.45 0.71 0.86 0.94 
0.5
9 
0.5
6 
Slovakia 
0.010
5 
0.026
5 
13.6610 13.3152 
2.847.4
5 
0.1
2 
0.02 
0.4
7 
42.54 4.59 0.77 16.068 2.91 
0.9
0 
0.96 0.83 0.80 1.00 
0.7
2 
0.5
5 
Slovenia 
0.010
6 
0.035
3 
14.2154 13.2196 
2.252.0
3 
0.1 0.03 
0.5
6 
40.93 4.91 0.6 21.880 3.04 
0.8
4 
0.73 0.73 0.96 1.00 
0.5
0 
0.5
8 
EU-10 
0.014
2 0.044 
13.6645
1 
12.7066
8 
3.050.5
9 
0.1
3 0.04 
0.5
3 41.55 7.19 0.67 14.292 5.52 
0.8
5 0.81 0.78 0.86 0.98 
0.6
2 
0.5
7 
 
Note: Figures are sample means. lnP1 (log) labour price, lnP2 (log) financial capital price, lnY1 (log) net loans in millions $, lnY2 (log) other earning assets in millions $, TA: 
Total assets in millions $, E/A: equity to assets ratio, LLP/L: loan loss provisions over total assets, L/A: loans to assets ratio, DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector 
as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread, HHI: Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, GDPcppp: GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 $, INFL: inflation rate, 
CR: composite credit regulations index, CR-Own: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, CR-Comp: foreign bank share of the domestic market, CR-PrS: extent 
of government borrowing relative to private sector borrowing with greater government borrowing resulting in lower ratings, CR-Nir: extent of interest rate controls with zero 
rating indicating government controlled nominal rates resulting in negative real rates, LR: composite labour regulation index, BR: composite business regulations index. Higher 
values of Indices denote a more liberal regulatory environment. 
Source: Fitch-IBCA, Beck et al. (2000), World Bank, and Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. 
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Table 2: Summary Banking and Economic Reform Ratings CEE Countries (2004-2009) 
Year CR CROwn CRComp CRPrS CRnir LR BR 
2004 0.82 0.8 0.77 0.85 0.99 0.62 0.59 
2005 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.97 0.64 0.58 
2006 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.98 0.65 0.57 
2007 0.9 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.98 0.69 0.56 
2008 0.9 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.98 0.69 0.56 
2009 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.78 0.99 0.66 0.59 
Total 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.98 0.65 0.57 
 
Note: Figures are sample means and scaled to a 0-1 ratio. Higher values denote a more liberal regulatory environment. CR: composite credit regulations index, CR-Own: 
percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, CR-Comp: foreign bank share of the domestic market, CR-PrS: extent of government borrowing relative to private sector 
borrowing with greater government borrowing resulting in lower ratings, CR-Nir: extent of interest rate controls with zero rating indicating government controlled nominal 
rates resulting in negative real rates, LR: composite labour regulation index, BR: composite business regulations index.  
Source: The 2010 version of the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom. 
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Table 3: CEE Banking Sector Cost Efficiency (2004-2009) 
 mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BUL 0.7284379 0.1657638 0.2596304 0.9457929 
CZS 0.8305003 0.1045656 0.424847 0.956909 
EST 0.8365716 0.0824385 0.6193992 0.9438678 
HUN 0.7643064 0.1831807 0.0439045 0.9684897 
LAT 0.8251347 0.099439 0.3596099 0.9598934 
LIT 0.8045001 0.1423296 0.3924884 0.9626565 
POL 0.7809053 0.1408322 0.2381616 0.9663312 
ROM 0.7809053 0.1408322 0.2381616 0.9663312 
SLV 0.7377331 0.1535675 0.2665328 0.9266417 
SLO 0.8861361 0.0436751 0.7458255 0.9643498 
EFF2004 0.752177 0.182842 0.238162 0.966331 
EFF2005 0.770741 0.131381 0.314497 0.941015 
EFF2006 0.78595 0.127923 0.252684 0.950434 
EFF2007 0.771899 0.148641 0.249643 0.960932 
EFF2008 0.80823 0.136375 0.202692 0.96849 
EFF2009 0.860191 0.059334 0.679478 0.948308 
Note: Stochastic frontier efficiency scores per country (sample period statistics) and year (CEE wide statistics) . 
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Table 4: Bank specific and financial structure determinants of efficiency (2004-2009) 
Variables Bank Specific Financial Structure 
ln(TA) -0.0573928*** -0.018828** 
 (0.005929) (0.0095357) 
E/A 0.7781396*** 0.8735739*** 
 (0.0779144) (0.0829741) 
LLP/L -0.0020933 0.0000198 
 (0.0129759) (0.0131967) 
L/A -0.148008*** -0.0485439 
 (0.0414926) (0.0472884) 
SPR  0.0007956*** 
  (0.0005311) 
lnGDPC  -0.2324928*** 
  (0.0532244) 
INF  -0.0000155 
  (0.0001041) 
HH  0.0017264** 
  (0.0008309) 
Const. 1.024962*** 2.55109*** 
 (0.0795239) (0.4151959) 
Obs. 1811 1646 
R2 0.031 0.094 
Number of Banks 268 268 
Note: Fixed-effect panel estimation of bank efficiency with robust standard errors. TA: total assets; E/A: equity to assets ratio; LLP/L: loan loss provisions to loans ratio; L/A: 
loans to assets ratio; SPR: net interest spread, GDPC: GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 prices; INF: inflation rate; HH: Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index. Country and time dummies included.  
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
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Table 5: Credit, Labour and Business Regulations (2004-2009) 
Variables Coeff. Sdt. Err. 
ln(TA) -0.04732*** 0.010532 
E/A 0.699963*** 0.104869 
LLP/L 0.17504 0.150124 
L/A -0.07329 0.058745 
DCPS -0.12891* 0.044962 
SPR 0.00186 0.003865 
INF 0.004534*** 0.001433 
CR -0.05648*** 0.011694 
LR 0.030019*** 0.010603 
BR 0.0287*** 0.010989 
Const. 1.003212*** 0.148299 
Observations 1153  
R-squared 0.1020  
Number of banks 268  
Note: Fixed-effects panel estimation of bank efficiency with robust standard errors. TA: total assets; E/A: equity to assets ratio; LLP/L: loan loss provisions to loans ratio; L/A: 
loans to assets ratio; DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread; INF: inflation rate; CR: credit regulation; LR: labor market 
regulation; BR: business regulations. Country and time dummies included.  
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
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Table 6: The impact of the Fraser sub-components of the Credit Regulation index on cost efficiency (2004-2009) 
Note: Fixed-effects panel estimation of bank efficiency with robust standard errors. TA: total assets; E/A: equity to assets ratio; LLP/L: loan loss provisions to loans ratio; L/A: 
loans to assets ratio; DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread; INF: inflation rate; CR-Comp: foreign bank share of the domestic market, CR-
PrS: extent of government borrowing relative to private sector borrowing with greater government borrowing resulting in lower ratings, CR-Nir: extent of interest rate controls with zero rating 
indicating government controlled nominal rates resulting in negative real rates. Country and time dummies included.  
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Variables  CR-Comp CR-PrS CR-Nir All types of Credit 
Regulations 
ln(TA) -0.05635*** -0.0523*** -0.05496*** -0.05329*** 
 (0.009914) (0.009419) (0.009471) (0.009902) 
E/A 0.714601*** 0.720123*** 0.725392*** 0.728003*** 
 (0.106403) (0.105628) (0.107335) (0.106659) 
LLP/L 0.228807 0.190993 0.223051 0.192248 
 (0.152183) (0.151153) (0.151988) (0.151528) 
L/A -0.1002* -0.09498 -0.09305 -0.09366 
 (0.058957) (0.058223) (0.058868) (0.058792) 
DCPS -0.13766*** -0.12456* -0.1257*** -0.12111*** 
 (0.045257) (0.044271) (0.045639) (0.046086) 
SPR -0.00172 0.0002 -0.00071 0.000729 
 (0.003874) (0.003862) (0.004022) (0.004032) 
INF 0.005495*** 0.004159*** 0.005478*** 0.004084*** 
 (0.001444) (0.001479) (0.001444) (0.001486) 
CR-Comp 0.002555   0.011795 
 (0.004585)   (0.045736) 
CR-PrS  -0.25958***  -0.25587*** 
  (0.070914)  (0.071353) 
CR-Nir   0.011607 0.08758 
   (0.015521) (0.154482) 
Constant 1.004942*** 1.182977*** 0.877116 1.093027*** 
 (0.132699) (0.1405) (0.208082) (0.215147) 
Observations 1153 1153 1153 1153 
R-squared 0.0632 0.0922 0.0661 0.0995 
Number of banks 268 268 268 268 
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Table 7: The impact of EBRD reform indexes on cost efficiency (2004-2009)  
Variables EBRD index market sector reform EBRD index financial sector reform EBRD index securities markets sector 
reform 
EBRD all indexes reforms 
ln(TA) 0.025251*** -0.03525*** 0.022257*** -0.03574*** 
 (0.007236) (0.00854) (0.007258) (0.008622) 
E/A 0.571029*** 0.894959*** 0.572929*** 0.894526*** 
 (0.121197) (0.08282) (0.119903) (0.08297) 
LLP/L 0.228886 0.141677*** 0.223256** 0.140699*** 
 (0.104243) (0.048741) (0.103213) (0.048741) 
L/A 0.007815 -0.05364 -0.00232 -0.0564 
 (0.059831) (0.046662) (0.05936) (0.046695) 
DCPS -0.15638** -0.10704*** -0.15745** -0.11125*** 
 (0.06736) (0.039241) (0.066586) (0.039432) 
SPR 0.001938** 0.001344** 0,001882** 0.001391* 
 (0.000797) (0.000536) (0.000789) (0.000536) 
INF 0.000429 0.0001344 0.000495 -0.00017 
 (0.000405) (0.000108) (0.000402) (0.000108) 
Compebrd 0.038479   -0.01326 
 (0.0264)   (0.020097) 
Bankebrd  0.001344  -0.05923*** 
  (0.016876)  (0.022341) 
Secebrd   0.057386 0.034655 
   (0.019458) (0.022533) 
Constant -0.21332* 0.001344*** -0.22583* 0.8367*** 
 (0.128921) (0.115145) (0.115955) (0.116112) 
Observations 1545 1545 1545 1545 
R-squared 0.1499 0.0720 0.1525 0.0770 
Number of banks 268 268 268 268 
Note: Fixed effects panel estimation of bank efficiency with robust standards errors covering three aspects of transition (EBRD 2010): markets (competition policy) (Compebrd); banking reform and interest rate 
liberalization (Bankebrd); and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (Secebrd)); TA: Total assets; E/A: equity to assets ratio; LLP/L: loan loss provisions to total assets ratio; L/A: loans to assets ratio; 
DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread. Country and time dummies included.  
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
 
 
36 
 
Table 8: The impact of Frazer and EBRD indexes: dynamic panel analysis (2004-2009) 
Variables Frazer Reforms Indicators EBRD reforms indicators 
EFFL1 0.322937*** 0.3693802*** 
 (0.0437087) (0.088008) 
ln(TA) -0.083277*** -0.042332*** 
 (0.011864) (0.0150913) 
E/A 0.6871281*** 0.7956339*** 
 (0.1959127) (0.2584948) 
LLP/L -0.0794308 0.1127762 
 (0.261147) (0.1476063) 
L/A -0.0463453 0.1294313 
 (0.0933141) (0.1164492) 
SPR -0.0114306 -0.0024578 
 (0.0047218) (0.0057406) 
DCPS -0.0013112** -0.0243268 
 (0.0005211) (0.0427321) 
CR -0.0203268  
 (0.0184892)  
LR 0.0597526**  
 (0.0144661)  
BR 0.0570376**  
 (0.0134679)  
Compebrd  0.0387171* 
  (0.022931) 
Bankebrd  0.0346008 
  (0.0311009) 
Secebrd  -0.0189348 
  (0.0373422) 
Constant 0.8620816*** 0.4336765 
 (0.2228869) (0.2862306) 
Observations 867 1100 
Number of banks 268 268 
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Wald-test 339.97 101.37 
P-values 0.000 0.000 
AR1 0.016 0.025 
AR2 0.485 0.564 
Sargan  0.242 0.419 
   
Note: Dynamic panel estimation of bank efficiency on Frazer and EBRD reform indexes covering Credit Regulation (CR), Labour Regulation (LR) and Business Regulation (BR) and three broad aspects of transition 
(EBRD 2010): competition policy (Compebrd); banking reform and interest rate liberalization (Bankebrd) and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (Secebrd) with robust standards errors. DCPS: domestic 
credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread. EFFL1: lagged efficiency. Wald tests the overall significance of the models, AR1 and AR2 are p-values of tests for autocorrelation in first 
differences and levels, and Sargan is the p-value for the Sargan test on the validity of over-identifying restrictions (i.e. testing whether the instruments as a group are exogenous). Country and time dummies included.  
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
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Table 9: Variance Decompositions 
 
Panel A: Variance Decompositions (VDCs) for EFF, CR, LR, and BR 
 s EFF CR LR BR 
EFF 10 0.798845 0.123555 0.072614 0.004987 
CR 10 0.175733 0.730508 0.014005 0.079754 
LR 10 0.069547 0.092056 0.678403 0.159995 
BR 10 0.165086 0.254625 0.1313 0.448989 
EFF 20 0.798818 0.123573 0.072622 0.004987 
CR 20 0.175795 0.73038 0.014088 0.079736 
LR 20 0.069653 0.092103 0.678288 0.159956 
BR 20 0.165086 0.254626 0.1313 0.448988 
Panel B: Variance Decompositions (VDCs) for EFF, Compebrd, Bankebrd, and Secebrd 
 s EFF Compebrd Bankebrd Secebrd 
EFF 10 0.7318 0.101249 0.150085 0.016866 
Compebrd 10 0.036759 0.754276 0.196972 0.011992 
Bankebrd 10 0.006039 0.032935 0.88633 0.074696 
Secebrd 10 0.007244 0.129355 0.191001 0.6724 
EFF 20 0.731131 0.101174 0.150067 0.017628 
Compebrd 20 0.036776 0.754006 0.196931 0.012287 
Bankebrd 20 0.006056 0.032957 0.886096 0.074891 
Secebrd 20 0.007313 0.129252 0.190987 0.672448 
Note: s defines the periods ahead of VDCs. EFF: efficiency; CR: composite credit regulation index, LR: composite labour regulation index, BR: composite business 
regulations index, Compebrd, competition policy, Bankebrd: banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and Secebrd: securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions.  
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Table A1: The components of the Fraser index of economic freedom used in the study 
 
 
Variable Category Nature Description 
CR-Own Credit Regulations Component Data on the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with larger shares 
of privately held deposits received higher ratings. When privately held deposits totalled between 95% and 100%, countries were given a 
rating of 10. When private deposits constituted between 75% and 95% of the total, a rating of 8 was assigned. When private deposits were 
between 40% and 75% of the total, the rating was 5. When private deposits totalled between 10% and 40%, countries received a rating of 2. 
A zero rating was assigned when private deposits were 10% or less of the total.  
CR-Comp Credit Regulations Component If a country approved all or most foreign bank applications and if foreign banks had a large share of the banking sector assets, then the 
country received a higher rating 
CR-PrS Credit Regulations Component This sub-component measures the extent to which government borrowing crowds out private borrowing. When data are available, this sub-
component is calculated as the government fiscal deficit as a share of gross saving. Since the deficit is expressed as a negative value, higher 
numerical values result in higher ratings. The formula used to derive the country ratings for this sub-component was (−Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax 
+ Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the deficit to gross investment ratio, and the values for Vmax and Vmin are set at 0 and −100.0%, 
respectively. The formula allocates higher ratings as the deficit gets smaller (i.e., closer to zero) relative to gross saving. If the deficit data 
are not available, the component is instead based on the share of private credit to total credit extended in the banking sector. Higher values 
are indicative of greater economic freedom. Thus, the formula used to derive the country ratings for this sub-component was (Vi − Vmin) / 
(Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the share of the country’s total domestic credit allocated to the private sector and the values for Vmax 
and Vmin are set at 99.9% and 10.0%, respectively. The 1990 data were used to derive the maximum and minimum values for this 
component. The formula allocates higher ratings as the share of credit extended to the private sector increases.  
CR-NiR Credit Regulations Component Data on credit-market controls and regulations were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with interest rates determined by the market, 
stable monetary policy, and positive real deposit and lending rates received higher ratings. When interest rates were determined primarily 
by market forces and the real rates were positive, countries were given a rating of 10. When interest rates were primarily market determined 
but the real rates were sometimes slightly negative (less than 5%) or the differential between the deposit and lending rates was large (8% or 
more), countries received a rating of 8. When the real deposit or lending rate was persistently negative by a single-digit amount or the 
differential between them was regulated by the government, countries were rated at 6. When the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the 
government and the real rates were often negative by single-digit amounts, countries were assigned a rating of 4. When the real deposit or 
lending rate was persistently negative by a double-digit amount, countries received a rating of 2. A zero rating was assigned when the deposit 
and lending rates were fixed by the government and real rates were persistently negative by double-digit amounts or hyperinflation had 
virtually eliminated the credit market.  
CR Credit Regulations Composite Composite index of the above 
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Note: The table reports only the components of the Fraser index of economic freedom used in this study. The index consists of five areas: (1) size of government; (2) legal 
structure and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to exchange with foreigners; and (5) regulation of credit, labour, and business. For the overall 
index as well as its components and its subcomponents a score of 0 indicates the lowest and a score of 10 the highest economic freedom (less regulatory restrictions). Source: 
The 2010 version of the Fraser index of Economic Freedom. 
 
  
LR Labour Regulations Composite A measure of the extent to which labour market rigidities are present. In order to earn high marks in the LR component, a country must allow 
market forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of conscription. 
BR Business Regulations Composite The variable aims to identify the extent to which regulations and bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition. In order to 
score high in this part of the index, countries must allow markets to determine prices and refrain from regulatory activities that retard entry 
into business and increase the cost of producing products. They also must refrain from using their power to extract financial payments and 
reward some businesses at the expense of others. 
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Table A2: The components of the EBRD indicators used in the study 
 
 
Note: The table reports only the components of the EBRD indicators used in this study. The EBRD transition indicators consist of four areas: (1) Enterprises; (2) Markets and 
trade; (3) Financial institutions; (4) infrastructure. Source: The 2010 version of the EBRD Transition Report.  
 
 
  
Variable Category Nature Description 
Compebrd Markets and Trade Component The scores range from 1 where most prices formally controlled by the government, to 4+ where  are standards and 
performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted 
entry to most markets 
Bankebrd Financial institutions Component Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation. The scores range from 1 where there is little progress beyond 
establishment of a two-tier system, to 4+ for countries with standards and performance norms of advanced industrial 
economies: full convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive 
banking services.   
Secebrd Financial institutions Component Concerns Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions.  The scores range from 1 where. little progress is 
made in this sector, to 4+ for countries  Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full 
convergence of securities laws and regulations with IOSCO standards; fully developed non-bank intermediation.   
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Table A3: Alternative Estimations of AR(1) Specification for Bank Efficiency 
Variables GMM Within Groups OLS Levels 
EFFL1 0.322*** 0.154*** 0.456*** 
 
(0.0437087) (0.07514) (0.070930) 
Observations 867 867 867 
Number of banks 268 268 268 
AR1 0.016 0.025 0.011 
AR2 0.485 0.256 0.746 
Sargan  0.242 0.283 0.481 
   
Note: Dynamic panel estimation of bank efficiency on Frazer and EBRD reform indexes covering Credit Regulation (CR), Labour Regulation (LR) and Business Regulation 
(BR) and three broad aspects of transition (EBRD 2010): competition policy (Compebrd); banking reform and interest rate liberalization (Bankebrd) and securities markets and 
non-bank financial institutions (Secebrd) with robust standards errors. DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread. EFFL1: 
lagged efficiency. Wald tests the overall significance of the models, AR1 and AR2 are p-values of tests for autocorrelation in first differences and levels, and Sargan is the p-
value for the Sargan test on the validity of over-identifying restrictions (i.e. testing whether the instruments as a group are exogenous). Country and time dummies included. 
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
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Notes 
1 In the literature prior studies consider either the EBRD index of banking sector reform (e.g. Fries and Taci 2005, Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. 2009, Brissimis et al. 2008, 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. 2009a, Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. 2009b, Delis et al. 2011) or the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Mamatzakis et al. 2013) but not both. 
2 According to Lagoarde-Segot (2016) and Buchanan (2016), Aalbers, (2015) defines financialization as “the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, 
measurements and narratives at various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), states and households”. 
3 See for instance the papers of Lagoarde-Sagot (2015), Buchanan (2016) and Sokol (2015) for a discussion on the concept of financialization. 
4 Following Barth et al. (2013) bank regulations and supervisory practices comprise a wide range of activities, such as capital regulation, entry regulations, activities restrictions, 
supervisory power and independence, external governance and private-sector monitoring. 
5We recognise the potential bias problem in the two step estimator but the main argument of opting for a two-step procedure is because we focus on the impact of a plethora of 
indexes such as Fraser and EBRD, and their sub-indexes, on efficiency, in addition to various other control variables. Including all variables in one stage would restrict attention 
to modeling heterogeneity in the error term of the SFA model rather than focusing on a more explicit specification of the underlying sources of inefficiency. There is also a 
practical consideration at stake, namely the likelihood function of the heterogeneous model often appears to be ill conditioned. Hence we have opted for the traditional two step 
procedure, which is common practice in the literature when there are many control variables, or second stage variables such as ours herein (see Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. 
2009, Kasman and Yildirim 2006, among others). 
6For simplification, we omit the time subscript (t).   
7The treatment of physical capital as a fixed input is relatively standard in efficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997), while the level of equity captures capitalization, 
insolvency risk and different risk preferences across banks (Berger and Mester 1997). 
8 Time trends (t) are included to capture the effects of technical progress with interaction terms with other regressors added to capture the effects of non-neutral technical 
change. 
9Due to the time dimension of the data series we test for the existence of panel unit roots in the underlying data using standard tests such as: Levin-Lin-Chu, Harris-Tzavalis, 
and Im-Pesaran-Shin. All tests show that our bank specific variables within the cost function framework of equation (2) appear to be stationary processes. 
10For a detailed review of the reform process see EBRD Transition Report (2010). 
11We believe that combining different indexes such as the Fraser index and the EBRD indicators, and taking into account financial and non-financial transition indicators give 
us a more complete picture of the environment in which banks operate in the CEE countries. 
12There are several studies that examine the impact of credit/financial reforms at an aggregate level on bank efficiency in transition countries (Fries et al. 2006, Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki et al., 2009, Delis and Papanikolaou, 2009 and Delis et al. 2011). An exception is the study of Mamatzakis et al. (2013) who consider the decomposition of credit 
regulation. 
13The CR-Own index was dropped from our analysis since it was consistently insignificant. 
14 We have also estimated the dynamic panel with OLS and the Within estimator. The former is known to yield an estimate of the lagged dependent variable coefficient 
which is upwards biased while the latter yields a downwards biased estimate with the magnitude of the bias dependent on the degree of persistence in the series. 
The GMM estimate which may also be biased is usually between these two. We report the estimation results in table A3 in the Appendix.  
15For robustness related reasons, we estimate both the static fixed effects model and the dynamic panel model without including the period of the financial meltdown. Results 
remain similar to the ones reported herein (available under request). 
16Optimal lag order of one is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), confirmed by Arellano-Bond AR tests.  
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17The results do not show violation of the normality assumption. Panel VAR results are available under request. 
18Low estimated covariances between the errors across equations would also be another indication that the ordering is not an issue. Our results show that estimated error 
covariances are indeed very low. 
19For instance, financial development is a source of growth; at the same time it must be accompanied by macroeconomic reforms, and regulation. In other words, successful 
transition in the business sector is mainly about removing the role of the state and encouraging private ownership and market forces wherever possible. However, markets 
cannot function properly unless there are well-run and effective public institutions in place in order to enforce rules and ensure fair competition (EBRD 2010). 
